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Fair Threats and Promises
1 Introduction
The role of threats and promises is fundamental in Game Theory, as the pre-
dictions of the outcomes of many dynamic games depend on their credibility.
For example, in Figure 1 from Klein, player 1 can promise to scratch 2´s back
if player 2 scratched 1´s back before. The result of the game depends on the
credibility of the promise of player 1 to scratch player 2´s back if she scratch
player 1´s back.
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Game 1
And in Figure 2, from Klein, player 1 can threat to break player 2´s back
if he does not scratch player 1´s back. The result of the game depends on the
credibility of the threat of player 1 to break player 2´s back if he doesn´t scratch
his back.
Game 2
As Klein and OFlaherty (1993) and Schelling (1960) show, a threat or a
promise has to have a commitment in order to be credible. They argue that
this commitment can be a psychological commitment to keep our own word.
However, the emotion of reciprocity can be a powerful commitment too. For
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example, in Game 1, the emotion of positive reciprocity can make credible the
promise of player 1 to scratch 2s back if player 2 scratch player 1s back and
in Game 2, the emotion of negative reciprocity can make credible the threat of
player 1 to break player 2s back if player 2 dont scratch player 1s back.
In this paper I argue that the concept of sequential reciprocity of Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) doesnt take correctly into consideration the role of
threats and promises and I develop a solution concept of reciprocity which I call
Fair Threats Equilibrium, that I believe is better at evaluating the fairness of
threats and promises.
The literature on reciprocity on Game Theory begins with Rabin (1993). In
his seminal paper, Rabin introduced his solution concept Fairness Equilibrium
(FE from now on), which is dened for static games. Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004) extended Rabin´s model to dynamic games with their solution
concept Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE from now on).
The main di¤erence between a static and a dynamic game is that some
strategies (some of which can be interpreted as promises and threats) that are
optimal in a static game, are no longer optimal (credible) in a dynamic game,
where a player is able to reconsider its play as the game advances. As Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium eliminates non-credible threats for standard dynamic
games, SRE eliminates non-credible threats for dynamic games with reciprocity
emotions.
The SRE denes the kindness of an strategy as a function of the strategies
of the other players of the game and requires that each player plays the optimal
action at each history of the game.
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However, in equilibrium, the SRE evaluates the kindness of each strategy by
evaluating the actions it prescribes only at the equilibrium path, without taking
in consideration the actions that are prescribed o¤ the equilibrium path. Since
promises and threats include the actions in both at the equilibrium path and
o¤ the equilibrium path I argue that to evaluate correctly the role of promises
and threats, the strategies have to be evaluated as a whole.
We believe that most individuals evaluate the kindness of a strategy inde-
pendently of the strategies of other players. For example in the Ultimatum
Game, an o¤er of 100% of the money should always be evaluated as kind, inde-
pendently of the receiver´s strategy. The SRE however, would evaluate an o¤er
of 100% of the money as kind, unkind or neutral, depending of the receiver´s
strategy1 . We believe this does not make sense.
We also believe that the Dictator should think as unkind threats from the
receiver if it is trying to force her to give a higher o¤er than what she considers
a fair o¤er, while threats to reject low o¤ers would be considered as kind, if they
are only trying to ensure the Dictator gives a fair o¤er (I consider a fair o¤er
50% of the money). The SRE however, evaluates as kind any threat that fullls
its purpose and forces a high o¤er from the dictator, given that the only action
to be evaluated is the acceptance of the equilibrium o¤er.
In this paper I develop a concept of reciprocity for dynamic games that
evaluates the kindness of complete strategies, by dening the kindness of a
strategy not as a function of the strategies of other players, but as a function of
the maximum payo¤ the opposite players can receive (if he plays the strategy
that maximizes his material payo¤s). This approach has three advantages.
The rst is that it is a concept of sequential reciprocity that better takes in
consideration the role of promises and threats. The second is that it is a simpler
concept of reciprocity than FE and SRE, one that doesnt evaluate the fairness
of a strategy as a function of the other playersstrategies. The third is that it
is closer to the concept of reciprocity that most individuals use in reality and
its predictions are closer to the experimental results.
1An o¤er of 100% of the money would be considered as unkind in the case the receiver´s
strategy is to reject an o¤er of 100% of the money, and accept any o¤er lower than 100% of
the money. In this case an o¤er of 100% would give the receiver a payo¤ of 0, which compares
negatively with a payo¤ of 99% of the money if the dictator had o¤ered this amount. We
believe this does not make sense given that it is the same receiver that is rejecting the o¤er.
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Survey
In a small survey conducted at the University of Guanajuato, I asked stu-
dents a few questions about the Ultimatum game. In the Ultimatum game
there are two players. At the beginning of the game, the rst player (Proposer)
choses the division of an amount of money between himself and the another
player. The second player (Responder) chooses to accept the division or not.
If he accepts both players are paid the division chosen by the Proposer. If the
Recipient rejects the o¤er, both receive zero.
I asked students what would be a fair division for part of the Proposer. I did
not state what was the strategy of the Responder. 14 of 17 students answered
that the 50-50 division was fair. One student answered a division of 80-20 in
favor of the Proposer. Only one student stated the fair o¤er was the highest the
Responder whould accept, as long as it was less than 50%. One student answer
that he did not believed there was a fair division. These answers are consistent
with the concept of fairness of a strategy as independent of the strategy of the
receptor.
For the Responder, I asked students for the strategies of the form accept
any o¤er that higher or equal than a constant k and reject any o¤er lower than
k. I asked what would be the fair value of k: 9 of 17 students gave a value of
k of 50%. 4 gave a value equal or higher than 50% and one gave the highest
possible value of k: This suggests that individuals evalute the strategies of the
Responder independly of the strategies of the Proposer and that they evaluate
the fairness of threats, as these strategies can be interpreted as threats.
I asked a couple of questions about the credibility of two threats. In the rst
one the Responder threatens the Proposer to reject any o¤er lower than 80% of
the money and the second one it threatens to reject any o¤er lower than 20%
of the money. While 15 of 17 students found incredible the threat of rejecting
any o¤er lower than 80% of the money, 12 found credible the threat when the
threshold was 20% of the money. This suggest that what gives credibility to a
threat is the fairness of it.
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The Model
In the sequential Prisoners Dilemma in Figure 3, Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004) argue that the emotion of reciprocity cannot make plausible un-
conditional cooperation by player 2, as player 2s strategy includes the promise
to play cooperate even as player 1 plays defect.
Figure 3
To eliminate this incredible promise, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
develop their solution concept SRE. The SRE requires that each player op-
timizes at every history. In the sequential Prisoners Dilemma above, the SRE
eliminates the incredible promise of unconditional cooperation by requiring that
when player 1 defects, player 2 optimizes by also defecting.
However, the SRE has the disadvantage of evaluating the kindness of a
player only by her actions at each history. For example, the SRE evaluates the
strategy cd as kind if C is played or unkind if D is played. Which action is
actually played depends on the strategy of player 1. I argue that for taking in
consideration correctly threats and promises, we should evaluate the kindness
of a strategy as a whole and independently of other playersstrategies. In gure
3, I believe that player 1 should evaluate as kinder the strategy cc than cd; that
is unconditional cooperation should be evaluated as kinder than conditional
cooperation, independently of the strategy of player 1. In order to accomplish
this I dene the kindness of a strategy as a function of the maximum payo¤
that it can give to the opposite players.
Let me give an example of an unreasonable SRE solution that is sustained
by unreasonable beliefs. Assume a very expensive Dictator game where the
Dictator divides one million dollars. For players that care much about fairness
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considerations, there is a SRE where the Dictator o¤ers the complete one mil-
lion dollars to the Receptor and the Receptor rejects. This equilibrium can be
sustained if the Dictator beliefs that the Receptor only accepts half a million
dollars and rejects any other o¤er. Given these beliefs, the SRE would evaluate
the o¤er as unkind, given that it is giving the Receptor a payo¤ of zero (even if
it is the same Receptor that is rejecting the o¤er). The Receptor will reject the
o¤er, given that he believes it is unkind. However, given that the Receptor is
rejecting the o¤er, the Dictator would also believe that the Receptor is unkind
and will o¤er one million dollars in order to be unkind in response. I believe
this equilibrium doesn´t make sense and an o¤er of one million dollars should
always be evaluated as kind. I propose a solution concept that eliminates these
unreasonable equilibria.
I analyze the case of nite multi-stage games with observed actions and
without nature. Ai is the set of (possible mixed) strategies for player i; ai 2 Ai
is a strategy for individual i, bij 2 Bij are the beliefs of individual i regarding
the strategy of individual j, and cijk 2 Cijk are the beliefs of individual i about
the beliefs of the individual j concerning the strategies of player k (second order
beliefs). The space of actions is the same as the space of beliefs and the space of
second order beliefs. Therefore we have that Ai = Bji = Cjki: i : A! R are
individual is material payo¤s given that A =
Q
i2N
Ai: ai(h) is the action that
the strategy ai prescribes at history h for player i. aijh is the same as strategy
ai; but playing the history h with probability one.
I dene rst what is an equitable payo¤ and use it as a reference point
to evaluate the kindness of a strategy. I propose that strategies that give a
potentially higher payo¤ to opposite players (if they play the strategy that
maximize their own materialpayo¤s) than the equitable payo¤ be evaluated
as kind and strategies that give a potentially lower payo¤ to opposite players
than the equitable payo¤ be evaluated as unkind.
We only look for the equitable payo¤s in the set of e¢ cient strategies. A
payo¤ that is not e¢ cient cannot be equitable given that the player is giving a
lower payo¤ to the opposite player and to himself.
I dene a players strategy as e¢ cient, if there is no other strategy that
always gives every player a higher or equal payo¤s, with strict inequality for at
least one player.
Ei =
fai 2 Ai j there exists no a0i 2 Ai such that for all j 2 N and for all a i 2 A i
we have that j(a0i; a i)  j(ai; a i);
with strict inequality for some jg
For the FE and SRE the equitable payo¤ for a player is the average between
the highest and the lowest payo¤ of the e¢ cient payo¤s, given her own strategy.
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For example, in the Dictator game, the equity payo¤ is for the Recipient to get
50% of the money. However, in the case of the Ultimatum game, the equity
payo¤ is not necessarily 50% of the money, given that the payo¤s for the Recip-
ient depend not only in the Dictator o¤er, but also in the Recipients decision
to accept or reject any o¤er. (Any o¤er would pay zero to the Recipient if he
were to reject the o¤er.) I believe that an o¤er of 50% of the money should
be seen as the equitable payo¤ in the Ultimatum game, independently on the
strategy of the Recipient. If the Dictator o¤ers a division to the Recipient, she
is giving him the possibility of accepting the o¤er. I believe that the kindness
of a strategy should be evaluated in function of the potential payo¤s it gives to
a player.
In order to make the equitable payo¤ independent on the strategy of the
receiver, my denition of equitable payo¤ is based on the maximum payo¤ a
player can potentially receive (by playing the strategy that maximize its own
payo¤).
The equitable payo¤ that player j believes is fair for player i (given what
player j believes everybody else is playing) is dened as
eji((bjk)k 6=i;j) =
1
2 [maxajAj maxaiAi fi (ai; aj ; (bjk)k 6=i;j)g+
minajEj maxaiAi fi (ai; aj ; (bjk)k 6=i;j)g ]
I believe the kindness of a player toward another player (let me call him
the receiver) has to be evaluated independently on the strategy of the receiver.
In order to do this, I evaluate the kindness of a strategy as the di¤erence of
the maximum payo¤s a receiver can get with that strategy, with respect to the
equity payo¤s.
Denition: the kindness of player i towards player j is given by:
fij (ai; (bik)k 6=i;j) = max
ajAj
j (ai; aj ; (bik)k 6=i;j)  eij((bik)k 6=i;j)
Denition: player is beliefs about how kind player j is with him is given by:
efiji (ai; (bij ; (cijk)k 6=i;j)i 6=j) = max
aiAi
i (ai; (bij ; (cijk)k 6=i;j)i 6=j) eji((cijk)i 6=j;k 6=i;j)
For example, in the Ultimatum game, an o¤er higher than 50% of the money
would be seen as kind, given that the maximum amount of money the Recipient
can get (by accepting) is higher than 50% of the money. And o¤ers lower than
50% of the money would be seen as unkind, given that the maximum amount of
money a Recipient can get is lower than 50% of the money. My denitions have
the advantage of been simpler, as the kindness of a strategy is not evaluated as
a function of the strategy of the receiver.
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Note that the kindness of a player toward the receiver may depend on the
strategies, and the beliefs of strategies of the rest of the players, as the intended
payo¤s may change with their strategies. However, I argue that has to be
independent of the strategies of the receiver.
Once I have completed the denitions of kindness and belief as regards kind-
ness I can dene an individuals utility function.
Denition: The utility of individual i is given by:
Ui (ai; (bij)i 6=j ; (cijk)k 6=j)
= i (ai; (bij)i 6=j) 
P
j 6=i
i

fij (ai; (bij)i 6=j)  efiji (bij ; (cijk)k 6=j)2
where i is a measure of how much importance the individual i gives to
the emotions of reciprocity. In the utility function above, the fairness payo¤
enter the utility function as a subtraction of the absolute value of the di¤erence
of the fairness of the players. I make this assumption for two reasons. One
is for simplicity. The second reason being to represent that individuals want
to reciprocate in the same magnitude the kindness and unkindness (according
to FE and SRE individuals want to reply any o¤ense with the most severe
punishment possible).
In order to eliminate the possibility of incredible promises and threats I
require that in equilibrium, the actions be optimal at each history, as the SRE
does.
A complication of evaluating the kindness of a strategy as a whole is that
a player may want to change her strategy at di¤erent histories. I will assume
that at each history, every player plays the action that is part of his optimal
strategy and that the credible strategy is the union of the actions that belong
to the optimal strategies at every history. For example, in the game in gure 3,
player 2 may want to play unconditional cooperation (cc) at history C and may
want to play unconditional defection (dd) at history D: I will assume that the
credible strategy is cd; as player 2 plays c as part of the strategy cc at history
C and plays d as part of the optimal strategy dd at history D: Although in this
example I get the same credible strategy as SRE in general my results will di¤er
from it.
I assume that in equilibrium, individualsbeliefs and beliefs regarding beliefs
have to be correct, and therefore an individuals beliefs have to match both their
beliefs regarding beliefs and their actual strategies.
Denition: a Fair Threat Equilibrium of an extensive game with perfect
information is a strategy prole a such that for every player i 2 N and every
non terminal history h 2 H nZ for which P (h) = i where ai =
Q
h2H
eai (h) where
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1) eai 2 argmaxai 2 Ai Ui (ai; (bij jh; (cijkjh)k 6=j)j 6=i)
2) bij = aj
3) cijk = ak
I name this equilibrium Fair Threat Equilibrium (FTE) as it incorporates
the idea that individuals not only want to reciprocate against kind or unkind
actions of other players, but the also want to reciprocate against kind or unkind
promises and threats.
One drawback of using this specic utility function is that I cannot prove
the existence of the Fair Threat Equilibrium as the utility function is not qua-
siconcave. However, I use this utility function because the solutions obtained
from this model represent more closely the experimental results. So far, I have
found an equilibrium in every example I have tried. In the Appendix I present
a variation of this utility function for which it can be proved that it has a Fair
Threat Equilibrium.
2 Examples
2.1 Dictator Game
Lets consider the case of the Dictator game. A player, the Dictator, chooses to
divide an amount of money between himself and another player, lets say the
Receptor. After his decision, the game ends and both players are paid what the
Dictator decided.
The prediction of the SRE is that the Dictator keeps all the money for
himself. Given that the Receptor does not have any choice to make, his kindness
toward the Dictator is zero. Therefore, the reciprocity part of the utility function
is zero for the Dictator and he should only maximize her own material payo¤
and keep all the money for herself.
The Fair Threat Equilibrium prediction. In my model, the equitable payo¤
for the Receptor is 50% of the money. Every o¤er lower than that would be
evaluated as unfair. Given that the Receptor does not take any decision, his
kindness function is zero. The Dictator maximizes her emotional utility by being
as kind to the Receptor as she is to her, making her kindness function zero. The
utility function of the Dictator is: UD =    (fD   fR)2: By solving the First
Order Conditions we get that the Dictator maximizes when fD =   12D : The
higher is the importance of the emotion of reciprocity for the Dictator (D); the
smaller she wants her unkindness to the Receptor.
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I believe that my models results represent more accurately the experimental
results. According to the Dictator Games: A Meta Study, by Christof Engel,
the Dictators on average give the 28% of the money. The 36% give nothing to
the Recipient, but the majority give something. 16% split in half the money.
A player that gives the average and has my utility function has a D of 2:27:
In order to represent a Dictator that does not share any money, we need that
1 > : In order to represent a Dictator that splits the money, we need that  is
arbitrarily large, which I recognize is not possible.2
2 In order to represent that some people want to be nice to others, even when they are not
nice to them, we could modify their utility function, adding a constant to the emotional part.
For example, if the utility function of the Dictator were UD =  (fD   fR  k)2 where k is
a positive constant, some individuals with a high  and high k would want to split the money
with the Receiver.
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2.2 The Ultimatum game
2.2.1 The strategy from the Responder
The only Responders strategies that can be part of an FTE are of the form:
accept any o¤er that is higher or equal than a constant n, reject any o¤er that
is lower than n. The FTE only allows strategies where players optimize in every
history. If it is optimal to accept an o¤er, then it is optimal to accept a higher
o¤er. Note that even if several strategies give the same maximum payo¤ to
the Proposer, the Responder would choose to accept higher o¤ers because the
material payo¤s.
According to the FTE, a threat to only accept o¤ers of more than 50% of the
money would be seen as unkind, as the maximum amount the Proposer can get
is lower than 50% if the Responder follows her threat (the most unfair threat
of all is to reject any o¤er lower than 100% of the money and only accept 100%
of the money). A threat to reject any o¤er lower than 50% of the money, but
to accept 50% or more would seem as fair as it gives the possibility to Proposer
to get 50% of the money. And threats that include accepting o¤ers lower than
50% of the money would be seen as kind.
Poner gráca
1
Offer 0
100 0 75 0 50 0 25 0 0 0
0 0 25 0 50 0 75 0 100 0
2
Offer 100
Reduced Ultimatum Game
Offer
75Offer
50
Offer
252 2 2 2
RA R R R RA A A A
In the FTE, the kindness from an o¤er n from the Proposer is given by:
n  50: The kindness of the Responder to the Proposer when she accepts o¤ers
higher or equal to a constant k is 100  k  50 = 50  k: I will nd the credible
strategy for the Responder by looking for the value of k for which the Responder
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is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er. The Responder will
accept higher o¤ers and reject lower o¤ers than k: The utility function of a
Responder that accepts an o¤er of k is UR = k   R4 (k   50)2 : If she
rejects, she has the choice of any strategy. Given that she is going to reject the
o¤er of the Responder, the value of k that is going to maximize her utility is the
one that makes her emotional payo¤ equal to zero. Therefore, if she rejects the
o¤er, her utility is zero. If for example, we assume that R = 1=2; the lowest
value of k where UR is equal to zero is k = 45:24: As R grows arbitrarily to
zero, we get that k goes to 50:
2.2.2 The o¤er from the Proposer
The utility of the Proposer that o¤ers n when he believes the lowest o¤er the
Responder will accept is k is: UP = 100   n   P ((50  k)  (n  50))2 : If
P = 1=2, we know from above that k = 45:24: We have that the utility is
UP = 100 n P (54:24  n)2 : After taking the First Order Conditions, we get
that the o¤er from the Dictator is n = 53:76: That is, he gives a little more than
what the Responder is going to accept, in order to be kind to him, given that
the Responder is also kind by accepting o¤ers lower than 50. As P becomes
smaller, the o¤er goes to k: As P becomes arbitrarily larger, the o¤ers n goes
to 100 k, that is, the Proposer tries to pay all the kindness of the Responder.
2.2.3 SRE
A drawback of the SRE is that it allows a high number of equilibria, many
of them unreasonable. For example, for a very large P and R (individuals
that only care about their emotional payo¤s) a SRE of the Ultimatum Game
is for the Proposer to o¤er 100% of the money to the Responder, and for the
Responder to accept any o¤er except 100% of the money. According to the
SRE, the strategy of the Proposer is unkind, given that her o¤er is the only
one the Responder would reject. And according to the SRE the strategy of the
Responder is unkind, given that it is rejecting the o¤er of the Proposer. These
strategies are a SRE as both players are maximizing their utility by paying
unkindness with unkindness.
2.2.4 Experimental Evidence
My models predictions are closer to the experimental evidence than those of
the SRE. According to Güth and Kocher (2013), the most common o¤er is 50%
of the money. On average players tend to give 40-50% and such o¤ers are almost
accepted. For very low o¤ers, the rate of acceptance approach zero.
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3 Conclusions
Reciprocity is a complex concept. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) extended
Rabin (1993) concept Fairness Equilibrium to dynamic games. Although their
solution concept: Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium eliminates non-credible
threats, it does not correctly take in consideration the role of threats and
promises.
The objective of this article is to develop a concept of sequential reciprocity
that gives more reasonable predictions when threats and promises are involved.
My concept: Fair Threats Equilibrium, evaluates the kindness of whole strate-
gies, not only of actions, what I argue is fundamental for consider correctly
threats and promises. My concept has the additional advantage of being a sim-
pler concept than Fairness Equilibrium and Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium
and being closer to experimental results.
I applied my solution concept to the Dictator and the Ultimatum games and
show that its predictions are close to the experimental results.
My concept may be useful to analyzed Repeated Games. As the collusion in
Repeated Games is sustained by threats, the Fair Threat Equilibrium is a good
solution concept to this type of games. It may be useful for narrowing the set of
equilibria that are possible according to the Faulk Theorem (Friedman year...).
It may be also useful to analyze the solution when explicit promises and
threats allow a commitment by the individuals that promises and threats.
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4 Notation
Ai is the set of (possible mixed) strategies for player i;
ai 2 Ai is a strategy for individual i,
bij 2 Bij are the beliefs of individual i regarding the strategy of individual j
cijk 2 Cijk are the beliefs of individual i about the beliefs of the individual
j concerning the strategies of player k
Ai(h) is the set of possible actions of player i at history h
aijh is the same strategy as ai; with the exception of history h; which is
played with probability of one
A =
Q
i2N
Ai
ai(h) is the action that the strategy ai prescribes at history h for player i
ai(h) is the action that the strategy ai prescribes at history h for player i:
aijh is the part of the strategy ai that follows the history h:
aijh is the same as strategy ai; but playing the history h with probability
one.
(aijh)(h) is the action that the strategy ainh prescribes at history h:
5 Appendix
In this section, we probe the existence of the FTE for a variant of a utility
function. Dufwenberg shows that we cannot use an standard proof of existence.
The reason being that we are requiring that at equilibrium players optimize at
every history of the game and the optimal strategy depends on actions beyond a
particular history. We follow Dufwenberg by showing that there is a xed point
in a best reply that includes every history of the game simultaneously.
Denition: The utility of individual i is given by:
eUi (ai; (bij)i 6=j ; (cijk)k 6=j)
= i (ai; (bij)i 6=j) +
P
j 6=i
ifij (ai; (bij)i 6=j)  efijibij ; (cijk)k 6=j (1)
Theorem: Every nite extensive game with perfect information and utility
function given by equation (1) has a Fair Threat Equilibrium.
Proof.
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As Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) proof of existence of their concept of
Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium we prove that there is an equilibrium where
players maximize at every history simultaneously using Kakutani´s xed point
theorem.
The best response for individual i at history h is:ei(a) = argmaxai 2 Ai Ui (ai; (bij jh; (cijkjh)k 6=j)j 6=i): Let´s dene the best
response as the set of the actions that these best responses prescribe at every
history:
 =
Q
i2N;h2H
ei;h(a).
First note that Ui is a continuous function because all components: the
absolute value, maximum and the addition are a continuos function. Therefore,
Bj(a j) is hemicontinuous: Because Ui is a quasi concave function on a, we have
that ei(a) is convex. Because ei(a) is continuous, ei;h(a) is also continuous and
therefore  is also continuos.
Given that A is a nonempty, compact, convex space and Ui is continuos in a,
and quasiconcave in ai,  is a nonempty, convex-valued and upper hemicounti-
nous correspondence.
Therefore, we can apply Kakutanis x point theorem. Hence there exists a
xed point in the best response. This xed point is a Fair Threat Equilibrium.
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